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 Funding Systems for Doctors, Schools and Social Landlords
  
  In the past decade there has been a minor revolution in how local services are funded.
Those delivering the services now have their own budgets. How these budgets are
calculated – how Whitehall pulls the purse strings – are now central issues in social policy.
In a new book, CASE members analyse how these systems were devised, the incentives
they embody, and how local service providers see them.
  A striking common theme is the increasing stress over the last century put on geographical
needs-based equity, including – indeed significantly – under Conservative governments in
the 1980s and 1990s.
  All three services moved away from directly encouraging particular activities towards more
use of the ‘passive’ incentives given by fixed budgets, particularly those devolved to
provider units. This may now be changing with growing emphasis on performance-related
funding.
  Equity objectives were seen as ‘obvious’ by health service respondents, but were less clear
in education and obscure in housing. GPs and schools tended to see funding as fair, even if
they did not understand it. Social landlords were fatalistic.
  All the systems were seen as complex, increasing the power of the centre. The technical
quality of the systems varied greatly, with the NHS formula based on more detailed data,
more sophisticated techniques, and more academic input.
  There were few accusations of party-political favouritism. There were complaints about the
inequity of differential treatment between different kinds of GPs and of schools (in capital
allocations). Housing respondents were more relaxed about differences in treatment.
London’s position was often seen as a problem.
  Conservative reforms of the late 1980s which devolved budgetary responsibility to lower
levels were welcomed and accepted – ‘ring-fencing’ of local authority housing revenue
accounts, Local Management of Schools, and the aspects of the GP fundholding system
which still apply to the new Primary Care Groups.
 
  Further Information
  Paying for Health, Education and Housing: How does the centre pull the purse strings? by
Howard Glennerster, John Hills and Tony Travers, with Ross Hendry is published by the
Oxford University Press (ISBN 0-19-924078-7; £40; available from booksellers or from
OUP – 24-hour credit card hotline: +44 (0) 1536 454534; e-mail: book.orders@oup.co.uk;
p&p for UK and Europe: £2.50 up to value of £50; free over £50; rest of the word: 10% of
total value of order with minimum £2.50).
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 Funding systems for health, schools and social housing
 Over the last twenty years, NHS funding has moved onto an increasingly sophisticated needs-
related basis, applied to smaller and smaller-sized areas. The last twenty years have reversed the
position of the 1970s, when resources were more successfully equalised between areas for
education than for health spending.
 
 Funding reaches most schools through a two-tier process. Since 1990 central government funding to
LEAs has been fixed amounts, depending on their Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs).
Funding for schools is mostly based on fixed amounts per pupil (adjusted for items like numbers of
lone parents, Income Support recipients, ethnicity, sparsity and local costs). Most of schools
budgets have to be passed to schools, but LEAs can set their own distribution system between them.
 
 The two parts of social housing – council housing and housing associations – are funded very
differently. This raises equity issues, as rents paid by different kinds of tenant can vary
considerably, even if in identical buildings and circumstances. It also means that there is no easy
way of judging whether a landlord is doing a good job. The incentives built into their funding
systems have changed in opposite directions. The pressures on local authorities now look more like
those on housing associations in the 1970s and 1980s, when they had to operate within pre-set
allowances. Housing associations became less constrained when they were allowed to set their own
rents after 1989. Recent rent restrictions to control Housing Benefit costs have hardened budget
constraints on both kinds of landlord, but the rent caps involved are unrelated to each other or to
other parts of the funding systems.
 
 Common and contrasting trends
 A striking common theme was the increasing stress put on geographical needs-based equity, even
by Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Differences include the systems used to slow
– or ‘damp’ – changes from year-to-year (where the system for NHS funding has been much more
successful than that in housing in achieving convergence while leaving the underlying principles
clear).
 
 The systems vary in how they embody positive incentives for particular behaviour, passive
incentives of a fixed budget constraint, or perverse incentives which may encourage undesired
behaviour. All three services have moved away from positive incentives towards much more use of
the passive incentives given by fixed budgets, particularly those devolved to provider units. Debate
over housing subsidies has been much more dominated by worries about perverse incentives than
the others.
 
 The structures of the funding formulae reflect technical constraints, such as the number of
observations of spending behaviour from which relative needs can be inferred. Health systems have
been more successful in generating data and more sophisticated in using them. Another important
difference comes from the involvement of local government in education and housing,
strengthening political pressures for local allocations, rather than acceptance of ‘national’ equity
objectives.
 
 
 Findings from interviews with providers
 There was a strikingly shared view of what equity meant from top to bottom of the NHS – equal
access to treatment for equal need. Lower down the system there was more scepticism and less
understanding about the detail of the system, but overall trust in its aims. Differences between
fundholding and non-fundholding GPs had breached equity principles, but the new Primary Care
Groups were popular with both groups, combining devolved budgets, but restoring a uniform
system. We saw a national service with clear common values to which everyone we interviewed
was signed up, despite the deep divisions of the 1990s.
 
 In our interviews with LEAs and schools there was virtually no questioning of the policy of
devolving budgets to schools, despite the criticism when it was first introduced. However, the
distribution of funding between LEAs was heavily questioned by LEA staff, who found it hard to
identify a clear equity objective. Most LEAs believed they should receive a larger share of the total,
although they did not suggest that allocations were skewed on party-political grounds. The system
was, however, seen as complex and confusing, even ‘bonkers’. In schools, there appeared far
greater acceptance of the funding system.
 
 The idea of an ‘equity’ objective baffled local housing respondents, who had never seen an official
statement relating to equity. However, landlords did not generally see the differences in treatment of
different tenants as a major issue. They were favourable to the reforms which had made social
landlords more ‘business-like’ (ring-fencing of council Housing Revenue Accounts and increased
financial autonomy and responsibility for associations). The balance of opinion was that the
associations’ 1989 capital funding reforms had achieved some efficiency gains. However, those
reforms also decontrolled association rents for new tenants, which meant that associations lost the
previous constraint on their recurrent spending.
 
 Comparing these responses:
 The systems were free-standing, with little apparent official activity in drawing lessons
between them.
 Equity objectives were seen as ‘obvious’ in health, but obscure in education and,
particularly, in housing.
 Debate over allocations between LEAs was highly politicised in terms of local interests,
contrasting with local health services where the possibly greater needs of other areas were
accepted. GPs and schools tended to see funding as fair, even if they did not understand it.
Social landlords’ responses were fatalistic.
 The technical quality of the systems varied greatly, with the NHS formula based on more
detailed data, more sophisticated techniques, and more academic input.
 All the systems were seen as complex, which increases the power of the centre, but this
complexity is unlikely to diminish.
 There were few accusations of party-political favouritism. There were complaints about the
inequity of differential treatment of fundholder GPs and of grant-maintained schools (in
capital allocations) in the last Parliament. Housing respondents were more relaxed about the
differences in treatment, partly reflecting the effects of Housing Benefit (which makes gross
rents of little immediate importance for most tenants).
 Efficiency and incentive concerns dominated housing funding far more than the others,
reflecting the way in which health and education funding rely on the ‘passive incentive’
effects of fixed budgets.
 The treatment of London recurred as a concern, with accusations from outside that the cost
adjustments favoured London providers.
 Despite initial controversy, Conservative reforms of the late 1980s which devolved
budgetary responsibility to lower levels were welcomed and accepted – ring-fencing of local
authority HRAs, Local Management of Schools, and the devolved aspects of GP
fundholding continued into the new Primary Care Groups.
 
 Where next? Directions for reform
 By 1999 all these systems were under review. One result may be less needs-based formula funding,
with more grants related to central assessments of performance. However, the centre does not
possess the detailed information to make good judgements about what local agencies should do.
Smaller units like schools, GPs, and smaller housing associations, or tenant-run estates do have the
local knowledge.
 
 The temptation to by-pass local government altogether may grow, not just in school-level
education, but also in social housing, as its ownership is increasingly transferred to free-standing
housing associations or companies. The pressure for the centre to involve itself in local detail will
become irresistible, but potentially unmanageable and inefficient. The solution may involve a
clearer role for local government as a local monitor and inspector.
 
 Looking at particular service areas:
 In health, the clearest problems stem from the different treatment of care costs for the
elderly depending on whether they count as ‘health’ or ‘social’ care. Formula funding of
Primary Care Groups could include an enhanced element for the very elderly which would
cover the costs of personal care as well as medical needs. An unprejudiced judgement could
then be made of the best form of care.
 The evidence basis for the education element in local government funding is limited. There
could be a national recommended spending level by age needed to achieve national
minimum required education standards, but this would require higher quality robust
evidence than is now available. The spending level would have to vary for children with
special needs, for children from deprived homes, and for those with particular language
difficulties. Such a formula could be used as the basis for funding each school, and would
discourage them from ‘creaming-off’ the most able children, but only if it reflected
differential needs.
 Housing subsidies could relate consistently to the elements of the cost of providing housing:
its current capital value; provision for depreciation or major repairs; and recurrent
management and maintenance. Ultimately all social housing could be provided by single-
purpose landlords, while local authorities concentrate on their role of monitoring and
‘enabling’ activities.
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